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Objectives.Uncertainty remains aboutwhether personal ﬁnancial incentives could achieve sustained changes
in health-related behaviors that would reduce the fast-growing global non-communicable disease burden. This
review aims to estimate whether: i. ﬁnancial incentives achieve sustained changes in smoking, eating, alcohol
consumption and physical activity; ii. effectiveness is modiﬁed by (a) the target behavior, (b) incentive value
and attainment certainty, (c) recipients' deprivation level.
Methods.Multiple sourceswere searched for trials offering adultsﬁnancial incentives and assessing outcomes
relating to pre-speciﬁed behaviors at a minimum of six months from baseline. Analyses included random-effects
meta-analyses and meta-regressions grouped by timed endpoints.
Results. Of 24,265 unique identiﬁed articles, 34 were included in the analysis. Financial incentives increased
behavior-change, with effects sustained until 18 months from baseline (OR: 1.53, 95% CI 1.05–2.23) and three
months post-incentive removal (OR: 2.11, 95% CI 1.21–3.67). High deprivation increased incentive effects (OR:
2.17; 95% CI 1.22–3.85), but only at N6–12months frombaseline. Other assessed variables did not independently
modify effects at any time-point.
Conclusions. Personal ﬁnancial incentives can change habitual health-related behaviors and help reduce
health inequalities. However, their role in reducing disease burden is potentially limited given current evidence
that effects dissipate beyond three months post-incentive removal.© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Smoking, poor diet-related behaviors, excessive alcohol consumption,
and physical inactivity contribute to the development of major non-
communicable diseases, i.e. cardiovascular diseases, type 2 diabetes, can-
cer and chronic respiratory diseases (Andersen et al., 2000; Batty et al.,
2008; Batty et al., 2001; Cox et al., 2000; He et al., 2007; Heidemann
et al., 2008; Teo et al., 2006), which together account for more than 50%
of preventable premature deaths worldwide (3four50.com, 2011; WHO,
2012). The World Health Assembly has recently pledged to reduce non-
communicable diseases by 25% by 2025 (WHO, 2013). Offering individ-
uals personal ﬁnancial incentives to change their health-related behavior
could contribute to attaining this ambitious target, but uncertainty re-
mains about the effectiveness of such schemes.
Personal ﬁnancial incentives have been shown to be effective in
changing several non-habitual health-related behaviors, including un-
dergoing vaccinations, attending screening, and adhering to healthcare
treatments (Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; Sutherland et al., 2008).
Whilst evidence indicates that incentive schemes can change the habit-
ual health-related behaviors that contribute to non-communicable dis-
eases (Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008), uncertainties remain
about the conditions under which change is achieved and sustained
after incentive removal (Jochelson, 2007; Marteau et al., 2009).
Authors of relevant existing systematic reviews (Jochelson, 2007;
Kane et al., 2004; Sutherland et al., 2008; Cahill and Perera, 2011;
Paul‐Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2008) have concluded that achieved
changes to habitual health-related behaviors are not sustained after re-
moval of ﬁnancial incentives. However, these reviews have assessed ef-
fects over time, without explicitly focusing on or systematically
analysing impacts after incentive removal. This distinction is important
since in some studies payment of the ﬁnal incentive has coincided with
the ﬁnal follow-up assessment (Donatelle et al., 2000a,b; Gallagher
et al., 2007; Jeffery et al., 1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989).
Furthermore, most existing systematic reviews have not investigated
factors that may modify behavioral responses to incentives, such as
the target behavior (Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008), incentive
value (Sutherland et al., 2008; Paul‐Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2008;
Lussier et al., 2006), certainty of incentive attainment (certain — e.g.
vouchers — vs. uncertain — e.g. lottery) (Leung et al., 2002) and recipi-
ents' deprivation level (Sutherland et al., 2008). Some evidence suggests
that under the right conditions ﬁnancial incentives could lead to
sustained changes (Cahill and Perera, 2011; Troxel and Volpp, 2012;
Volpp et al., 2009), highlighting the need for research to move beyond
the question ofwhether incentiveswork, to elucidate the circumstances
under which they are most effective in achieving and sustaining chang-
es (Marteau et al., 2009).
The present systematic review aims to provide a more complete as-
sessment of the effects of personal ﬁnancial incentives on habitual
health-related behaviors in adults by investigating:
i. the effectiveness of incentives for smoking cessation, healthier eat-
ing, reduced alcohol consumption, and increased physical activity,
a. regardless of whether incentives are still offered, andb. when incentives have been removed;
ii. whether the effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives is modiﬁed by
a. the target behavior,
b. incentive value and attainment certainty, and
c. recipients' deprivation level.
Methods
Further information on the review methods are presented in the protocol
registered on PROSPERO, record ID CRD42012002675 (available here: http://
www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO/display_record.asp?ID=CRD42012002675).
Study eligibility criteria
Studies eligible for consideration in this reviewwere randomized controlled
trials assessing outcomes relating to target behaviors at a minimum of six
months from baseline and allocating adults to the offer of ﬁnancial incentives
or i) no treatment; ii) the same treatment as those incentivized, without the
offer of incentives; or iii) incentives differing in attainment certainty or amount.
Studies assessing multi-component interventions precluding assessment of the
independent effects of incentives, and studies offering incentives of symbolic or
no monetary value or not contingent on achievement of target outcomes, were
not eligible.
Literature searches
A detailed search strategy (Appendix A, Text S1) was used to search the fol-
lowing electronic databases for records of eligible studies from inception to July
2012: MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, SCOPUS, EconLit, the Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials and the Cochrane Database of Systematic
Reviews. Searches were limited to studies of adults. No language restrictions
were applied. Reference lists of relevant papers and grey literature resources
(HMIC, online clinical trials registers, Google Scholar and websites of key orga-
nizations) were also searched.
Study selection and data extraction
The titles and abstracts of identiﬁed records were screened by one author
(EM). The full-text reports of potentially eligible studies were independently
assessed by one author (EM) and one trained research assistant (JT). Disagree-
ments were resolved by consensus.
One author (EM) and one trained research assistant (LSR) independently
extracted all data.
Dichotomous outcome data were extracted as measures of effectiveness in
terms of the attainment or non-attainment of pre-speciﬁed target levels of
behavior-change, to allow for overall estimates of behavior-change across target
behaviors. If outcome data were unavailable or not presented in dichotomous
form, study authors were contacted and requested to provide these. Where
these data were unavailable, continuous data were extracted and later re-
expressed as odds ratios (see Data analysis). Relevant existing systematic re-
views were also checked for missing data.
During the data extraction process, incentives were classiﬁed according to
their overall value as either ‘low’ (b$400) or ‘high’ (≥$400). Judgments regard-
ing the classiﬁcation of value for the only study included in the review which
was conducted in a low income country (Giné et al., 2010) were made based
on information reported by the study authors that incentives constituted
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using the http://www.usinﬂationcalculator.com/ website conﬁrmed that
the classiﬁcation of value for all studies included in the analyses remained
the same when taking inﬂation into account. Incentives were also classiﬁed
according to their type as ‘certain’ (all incentives excluding lotteries) or ‘un-
certain’ (lotteries). Participants' deprivation level was classiﬁed at the study
level as either ‘high’ or ‘other’ based on any relevant information available in
the included reports (e.g. income, employment, education, ethnicity, SES
scores). If no information was reported to allow classiﬁcations to be made,
study authors were contacted and requested to provide relevant data (See regis-
tered protocol on PROSPERO, available here: http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/
PROSPERO/display_record.asp?ID=CRD42012002675 for a justiﬁcation of the
cut-off level regarding the classiﬁcation of incentive value, as well as the pre-
speciﬁed conditions relating to the classiﬁcation of deprivation level).
Assessment of methodological quality of included studies
One author (EM) and one trained research assistant (LSR) independently
assessed the risk of bias of included studies, by applying the Cochrane Collabo-
ration risk of bias tool (Higgins et al., 2011), following deﬁnitions and criteria
provided in the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions
(Higgins et al., 2011). When judging the risk of performance bias, the level of
standardization of study procedures between groups (i.e. whether studies had
controlled for the additional processes inherit in the delivery of incentives, com-
pared to regular treatment) was also assessed. When judging the risk of detec-
tion bias, the reliability of outcome measures (i.e. whether outcome assessors
could have been deceived by participants) was also assessed. For cluster-
randomized controlled trials, the potential risk of recruitment biaswas also con-
sidered. Inconsistencies in judgements were resolved by consensus.
Data analysis
Dichotomous outcome data were analysed by calculating an odds ratio (OR)
for each study as effect size, along with a 95% conﬁdence interval. Outcomes
assessed at various time-points were analyzed separately based on pre-
speciﬁed intervals and the availability of data corresponding to each of these
(months from intervention start: 6, N6–12, N12–18, N18; months from incen-
tive removal: N2–3, N3–6, N6). When dichotomous data were not available,
but continuous outcome data were, a standardized mean difference (SMD)
was calculated and converted to an odds ratio on the basis of a logistic distribu-
tional assumption for the continuous outcome (Anzures‐Cabrera et al., 2011).
Speciﬁcally, the approximate log(OR) was obtained as SMD π=
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
. Missing
standard deviations for change in bodyweightwere calculated using the formu-
laproposedbyAvenelletal. (2004)(SDofweightchange=5.915+(0.283×ab-
absolute value of mean change in weight)).
Heterogeneity was assessed via examination of forest plots and calcula-
tion of the I-squared statistic. Data were synthesized via meta-analyses
grouped by timed endpoints. Univariable and multivariable meta-
regressions were conducted to assess the effect of moderating variables on
log(OR). These were conducted for outcomes relating to 6 and N6–
12 months from baseline, and N2–3 and N6 months from incentive removal,
but not for other time-points due to the small number of corresponding
between-study comparisons. Moderating variables investigated were target
behavior, incentive attainment certainty, incentive value, participant depri-
vation level, and judgements of potential bias related to standardization of
study procedures and reliability of outcome measurements. Two-way inter-
actions were examined between pairs of effect modiﬁers. All meta-
regression analyses were conducted using metareg in Stata (Harbord and
Higgins, 2008). Summary effect sizes and their 95% conﬁdence intervals
were computed using random-effects meta-analysis models.
Results
The ﬂow of studies through the systematic review process is pre-
sented in Fig. 1 (Moher et al., 2009). From 24,265 unique study records
identiﬁed by searches, 39 studies (reported in 53 articles) were accept-
ed into the review (Appendix A, Text S2). Thirty-four of these, compris-
ing 10,585 adult participants, were included in the meta-analysis. Five
studies were excluded from the analysis for four reasons: report of un-
suitable measures of outcome dispersion (Francisco et al., 1994); inclu-
sion of incentivized groups not differing in value and/or attainmentcertainty without a control group to which a combination of these
could be compared (Jeffrey, 1983); lack of data relating to follow-ups
at or beyond 6 months from baseline (Mahoney, 1974; Norton and
Powers, 1980); use of crossover method in the delivery of incentives
and a lack of control group to which a combination of the treatment
groups could be compared (Wing et al., 1981). Characteristics and re-
sults of included studies are presented in Tables S1 & S2 (Appendix A).
The majority of included studies (n = 36) were conducted in the
USA (Donatelle et al., 2000a,b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Jeffery et al.,
1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Volpp et al., 2009;
Francisco et al., 1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and
Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Galbo,
2011; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002;
Higgins et al., 2004; 2012; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998;
1993; John et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986;
Long et al., 2012; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002;
Volpp et al., 2008; 2006; Windsor et al., 1988; Wing et al., 1996; Bloch
et al., 2006; Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009). Twelvewere con-
ducted within workplaces (Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Volpp
et al., 2009; Francisco et al., 1994; Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al., 1993;
Hennrikus et al., 2002; Jason et al., 1995; Windsor et al., 1988; Bloch
et al., 2006; Gomel et al., 1993; Hunter, 2011), 15within the community
(Jeffery et al., 1990; Giné et al., 2010; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974;
Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998;
1993; John et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986;
Saccone and Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2008; Wing et al., 1996), 11 in
medical/health settings (Donatelle et al., 2000a,b; Gallagher et al.,
2007; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al.,
2004; 2012; Long et al., 2012; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2006;
Crowley et al., 1995) and one in an academic setting (Tevyaw et al.,
2009). Nineteen focused on smoking cessation (Donatelle et al.,
2000a,b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989;
Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002;
Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins
et al., 2004; 2012; Jason et al., 1995; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al.,
2006; Windsor et al., 1988; Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009),
15 on indicators of healthier eating and/or physical activity (i.e. body
weight, blood cholesterol, or haemoglobin levels) (Francisco et al.,
1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing
et al., 1981; Galbo, 2011; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1993; John et al., 2011;
Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Long et al., 2012;
Saccone and Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2008; Bloch et al., 2006) and
two on physical activity (Wing et al., 1996; Hunter, 2011). Three studies
targeted more than one behaviour (Jeffery et al., 1990; 1998; Gomel
et al., 1993). No eligible studies were identiﬁed in which healthier eat-
ing (rather than changes to indicators of this behaviour) was explicitly
incentivized. Furthermore, no eligible studies measuring outcomes re-
lating to alcohol consumption were found. Twenty-six studies included
assessment of outcomes after incentive removal (Volpp et al., 2009;
Giné et al., 2010; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers,
1980; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al.,
2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2004; 2012; Jason et al.,
1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1993; John et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges,
1988; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al.,
2008; 2006; Windsor et al., 1988; Wing et al., 1996; Crowley et al.,
1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993; Hunter, 2011). The dura-
tion of ﬁnancial incentive schemes ranged from three weeks (Tevyaw
et al., 2009) to 18 months (Hennrikus et al., 2002; Jeffery et al., 1998;
1993). Most studies (n = 30) offered incentives alongside concurrent
intervention components to change target behaviors, (e.g. counselling,
self-helpmanuals, brochures, professional advice, nicotine replacement
therapy) (Donatelle et al., 2000a,b; Jeffery et al., 1990; Klesges et al.,
1987; Rand et al., 1989; Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Jeffrey,
1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981;
Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Galbo, 2011; Hennrikus et al., 2002;
Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998; 1993; John et al., 2011;
Fig. 1. PRISMA ﬂow diagram.
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Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2008; 2006; Windsor et al., 1988;
Wing et al., 1996; Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Gomel
et al., 1993). All studies included in the meta-analysis compared in-
centives with groups receiving the same treatment as incentivized
groups without the offer of incentives. Two studies also included
“no treatment” control groups, which were excluded from the analysis
(Jeffery et al., 1993; Saccone and Israel, 1978). The incentives used in
32 studies were classiﬁed as ‘certain’ (Donatelle et al., 2000a; b;
Gallagher et al., 2007; Jeffery et al., 1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand
et al., 1989; Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Jeffrey, 1983;
Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981;
Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Galbo, 2011; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins
et al., 2004; 2012; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998; 1993;
John et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Long
et al., 2012; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp
et al., 2006; Windsor et al., 1988; Bloch et al., 2006; Tevyaw et al.,
2009; Hunter, 2011). Those used in four studies were classiﬁed as ‘un-
certain’ (Francisco et al., 1994; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Wing et al.,
1996; Crowley et al., 1995) and in two as ‘certain and uncertain’ (i.e.
participants were offered vouchers/cash and chances to win lotteries)
(Hennrikus et al., 2002; Gomel et al., 1993). One study (Volpp et al.,
2008) included two groups differing in incentive attainment certainty.
The value of incentives used in 20 studies was classiﬁed as ‘low’(Donatelle et al., 2000a; Jeffery et al., 1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand
et al., 1989; Francisco et al., 1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974;
Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery
et al., 1984; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Long et al.,
2012; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2006; Windsor et al.,
1988; Bloch et al., 2006; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Hunter, 2011) and as
‘high’ in 18 studies (Donatelle et al., 2000b; Gallagher et al., 2007;
Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Higgins et al., 2011; Galbo, 2011;
Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins
et al., 2004; Jeffery et al., 1998; 1993; John et al., 2011; Shoptaw et al.,
2002; Volpp et al., 2008; Wing et al., 1996; Crowley et al., 1995;
Gomel et al., 1993). One study (Donatelle and Hudson, 2002) included
two incentivized groups differing in their classiﬁcation of value. Partic-
ipants' deprivation level was classiﬁed as ‘high’ in 12 studies (Donatelle
et al., 2000a; b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Rand et al., 1989; Giné et al., 2010;
Donatelle andHudson, 2002;Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; 2012;
Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2006; Crowley et al., 1995) and as
‘other’ in 22 (Jeffery et al., 1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Volpp et al.,
2009; Francisco et al., 1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al.,
1993; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984;
1998; 1993; John et al., 2011; Kramer et al., 1986; Long et al., 2012;
Saccone and Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2008; Windsor et al., 1988;
Bloch et al., 2006; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993; Hunter,
2011). Five studies did not include any information to allow for the
79E. Mantzari et al. / Preventive Medicine 75 (2015) 75–85latter classiﬁcation to be made (Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers,
1980; Wing et al., 1981; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Wing et al., 1996)
Quality of included studies
Reviewers' risk of bias judgements are presented in Fig. S1 (Appen-
dix A).
Most studies provided insufﬁcient detail to enable assessment of the
integrity of randomization (n= 26) (Donatelle et al., 2000a; b; Klesges
et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Francisco et al., 1994; Jeffrey, 1983;
Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981;
Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil
et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2012; Jason et al.,
1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998; 1993; Klem and Klesges, 1988;
Kramer et al., 1986; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Wing et al., 1996; Bloch
et al., 2006; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993) and allocation con-
cealment (n = 30) (Donatelle et al., 2000a; b; Jeffery et al., 1990;
Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Giné et al., 2010; Francisco et al.,
1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing
et al., 1981; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al.,
1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2012;
Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998; 1993; John et al., 2011;
Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Saccone and Israel, 1978;
Shoptaw et al., 2002; Wing et al., 1996; Bloch et al., 2006; Tevyaw
et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993). Because of the nature of ﬁnancial incen-
tive schemes, participants were not blinded in any of the studies. Most
did not blind personnel and provided insufﬁcient detail to judgewheth-
er this resulted in increased risk of bias (n = 32) (Donatelle et al.,
2000a; b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989;
Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Francisco et al., 1994; Jeffrey,
1983; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981;
Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al.,
2004; 2012; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998; 1993; John
et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Saccone and
Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2008; Windsor et al.,
1988; Wing et al., 1996; Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009;
Gomel et al., 1993). Themajority of studies had sufﬁciently standardized
study procedures between incentivized and control groups, therefore
diminishing the possibility that obtained outcomes were the result of
the additional processes inherit in incentive delivery (n = 29) (Jeffery
et al., 1990; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Francisco et al.,
1994; Jeffrey, 1983; Norton and Powers, 1980; Wing et al., 1981;
Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002;
Higgins et al., 2004; 2012; Jason et al., 1995; Jeffery et al., 1984; 1998;
1993; Klem and Klesges, 1988; Long et al., 2012; Saccone and Israel,
1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2006; Windsor et al., 1988;
Wing et al., 1996; Bloch et al., 2006; Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw
et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993; Hunter, 2011). In all but two studies
(Volpp et al., 2009; Jeffery et al., 1998), outcome assessors were consid-
ered to have been adequately blinded or the risk of bias resulting from a
lack of blinding was judged to be minimal. Most studies used reliable
outcome measures (n = 27) (Donatelle et al., 2000a; b; Gallagher
et al., 2007; Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010; Francisco et al.,
1994; Mahoney, 1974; Norton and Powers, 1980; Galbo, 2011;
Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; 2012;
Jeffery et al., 1984; 1993; John et al., 2011; Klem and Klesges, 1988;
Long et al., 2012; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002;
Volpp et al., 2008; 2006; Windsor et al., 1988; Bloch et al., 2006;
Crowley et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Gomel et al., 1993). One
cluster-randomized controlled trial was considered at high risk of re-
cruitment bias (Giné et al., 2010).
Impact of ﬁnancial incentives on habitual health-related behaviours
Moderate levels of heterogeneity were identiﬁed in the results
of meta-analyses between studies at most time-points, apart fromN18 months from intervention start and N3–6 and N6 months
from incentive removal. These derived from moderate to substan-
tial inconsistencies observed at these time-points in relation to
the results of studies assessing smoking cessation (Figs. 2 & 3).
Personal ﬁnancial incentives increased attainment of target levels of
behavior-change at all time-points from interventions start, apart from
N18 months (Table 1; Fig. 2). Financial incentives were effective in sus-
taining changes to overall behavior for up to N2–3 months after incen-
tive removal, but not thereafter (Table 1; Fig. 3). Overall effects across
behaviors followed a monotonic trend, weakening over time, when
assessed both from intervention start and after incentive removal.
Personal ﬁnancial incentives increased smoking cessation up to
N12–18 months from intervention start. Improved cessation rates
were sustained for up to N2–3 months after incentive removal. Incen-
tives also increased the attainment of target indicators of healthier eat-
ing and/or physical at 6 and N6–12 months from intervention start.
Changes were not sustained after incentive removal. Physical activity
was measured only at 6 and N12–18 months from intervention start
and N2–3 months after incentive removal: ﬁnancial incentives did not
to lead to increased target levels of physical activity at any of these
time-points (Table 1, Figs. 2 & 3).
Effect modiﬁers
The effect of ﬁnancial incentives was not independentlymodiﬁed by
the target behavior, incentive value or attainment certainty at any of the
assessed time-points. Both univariable (Table 2) and multivariable
meta-regressions (Appendix A, Table S3) produced similar results.
Univariable but not multivariable analysis showed participants' depri-
vation level modiﬁed the effect of incentives at N6–12 months from in-
tervention start, but not at other time-points: studies including highly
deprived participants (n = 10) generated an average effect approxi-
mately twice the size of studies including non-deprived participants
(n = 10) (OR = 2.17; 95% CI 1.22 to 3.85) (Table 2; Fig. 4).
One interaction was found to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level at 6 months from intervention start: use of high value incentives
was associated with a higher increase in smoking cessation than lower
value incentives. The summary odds ratio for smoking cessation from
studies using low value incentives (n = 10) was 1.49, CI 95% 1.12 to
1.98. We did not identify any statistically signiﬁcant two-way interac-
tions at any other time-points.
Discussion
Personal ﬁnancial incentives were effective in increasing attainment
of target levels of health-related behavior-change, with beneﬁcial ef-
fects lasting up to 18 months from intervention start, but weakening
over time. Changes were sustained up to three months after incentive
removal. The target behavior, incentive value and attainment certainty
did not independently modify effects at any time-point. An interaction
between target behavior and incentive value modiﬁed effects at six
months from intervention start, with high value incentives increasing
smoking cessation. Recipients' deprivation level modiﬁed effects be-
tween six and 12 months from intervention start, with higher depriva-
tion increasing attainment of target levels of behavior-change.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst systematic review to provide an
overall estimate of the impact of ﬁnancial incentives across habitual
health-related behaviors. Interpretation of the ﬁndings, however, re-
quires some caution. Not all behaviors classiﬁed as habitual and
health-related were represented in this review. Searches did not yield
any eligible studies assessing outcomes related to alcohol consumption.
Furthermore, although the overall effectiveness of incentives weakened
over time, this coincided with a decrease in the number of comparisons
at each time-point. As such, ﬁndings might represent a true negative ef-
fect or limited statistical power to detect effects at later time-points.
Moreover, although incentive effectiveness was not modiﬁed by the
Fig. 2. Study estimates of ﬁnancial incentives effects on health behaviors at time-points from intervention start.
80 E. Mantzari et al. / Preventive Medicine 75 (2015) 75–85
Fig. 3. Study estimates of ﬁnancial incentives effects on health behaviors at time-points after incentive removal.
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behaviors suggests that summary effect sizes were driven by studies
assessing smoking cessation: This was the only behavior for which
changes were maintained up to 18 months from intervention start
and sustained after incentive removal. Finally, although attainment of
target levels of physical activity was unaffected by the offer of ﬁnancial
incentives, ﬁrm conclusions would be premature given that only three
included studies assessed physical activity.
Most eligible studies included in this systematic review evaluated
interventions targeting smoking cessation, which could partiallyexplainwhy incentives appearmore promising for changing this behav-
ior compared with others. A novel ﬁnding of this review, permitted by
an explicit focus on post-incentive effects, is that smoking cessation
was sustained after incentive removal. This may be in part related to in-
clusion in this review of studies assessing the impact of ﬁnancial incen-
tives on smoking cessation during pregnancy (Donatelle et al., 2000a; b;
Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004;
2012). Indeed, ﬁve out of seven comparisons assessing smoking cessa-
tion N2–3 months after incentive removal targeted pregnant smokers.
Personal ﬁnancial incentives are the most effective intervention for
Table 1
Overall behavior-change (summary odds ratio with 95% CI) and change for targeted behaviors.
Measurement time from intervention
start (months) 
Measurement time after incentive  
removal (months)
Behavior/ 
Outcome
6 >6–12 >12–18 >18 >2–3 >3–6 >6
Overall
1.70
(1.42 to 2.02)
(n = 33)
1.59
(1.21 to 2.08)
(n = 28)
1.53
(1.05 to 2.23)
(n = 13)
1.04
(0.88 to 1.21)
(n = 5)
2.11
(1.21 to 3.67)
(n = 11)
1.31
(0.90 to 1.90)
(n = 9)
1.10
(0.95 to 1.27)
(n = 13)
Smoking 
cessation
1.80
(1.37 to 2.37)
(n = 21)
1.67
(1.13 to 2.45)
(n = 17)
2.69
(1.39 to 5.23)
(n = 6)
1.06
(0.90 to 1.25)
(n = 3)
2.57
(1.20 to 5.54)
(n = 7)
1.31
(0.90 to 1.90)
(n = 9)
1.16
(0.94 to 1.43)
(n = 7)
Healthier 
eating
/physical 
activity
indicators
1.66
(1.28 to 2.15)
(n = 8)
1.39
(1.03 to 1.88)
(n = 11)
1.20
(0.81 to 1.78)
(n = 5)
0.77
(0.43 to 1.37)
(n = 2)
1.99
(0.53 to 7.42)
(n = 3)
n/a
1.11
(0.76 to 1.63)
(n = 6)
Physical 
activity
1.29
(0.97 to 1.72)
(n = 4)
n/a
0.75
(0.41 to 1.34)
(n = 2)
n/a
1.21
(0.85 to 1.71)
(n = 1)
n/a n/a
Note: n denotes number of comparisons. Eight studies (Jeffery et al., 1990; Donatelle and Hudson, 2002; Jeffery et al., 1998, 1993; Saccone and Israel, 1978; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp
et al., 2008; Windsor et al., 1988) included more than one incentivized group and appropriate control and thus offered more than one comparison at assessed time-points. These were
included in the analysis as separate studies.
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et al., 2009), although the sustainability of their effects remains
unexplored. One of the characteristics of studies demonstrating this ef-
fectiveness is the use of large rewards. Large rewards have been predict-
ed to motivate greater behavior-change (Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland
et al., 2008; Lussier et al., 2006; Sigmon and Patrick, 2012). Incentive
value in the present review modiﬁed the impact of incentives onTable 2
Results from meta-regression analyses according to time-point.
Univariable meta-regression
Measurement time from intervention start (mon
Behavior Coefﬁcient estimates
(95% CI)
P-values Coefﬁcient est
(95% CI)
Smoking cessation vs. healthier
eating/physical activity indicators
0.73 (0.44 to 1.23)
(n = 21 vs. 8)
0.23 0.85 (0.44 to 1
(n = 17 vs. 11
Smoking cessation vs. physical activity 0.90 (0.59 to 1.37)
(n = 21 vs. 4)
0.60 n/a
(n = 17 vs 0)
Attainment certainty
Certain vs. uncertain 0.57 (0.11 to 3.05)
(n = 30 vs. 2)
0.46 0.53 (0.16 to 1
(n = 24 vs. 2)
Certain vs. certain and uncertain 0.71 (0.28 to 1.80)
(n = 30 vs. 2)
0.51 0.44 (0.13 to 1
(n = 24 vs. 2)
Monetary value
High vs. low 0.84 (0.58 to 1.22)
(n = 18 vs. 15)
0.35 0.81 (0.41 to 1
(n = 19 vs. 9)
Level of deprivation
High vs. low 1.25 (0.84 to 1.87)
(n = 18 vs. 13)
0.26 2.17 (1.22 to 3
(n = 17 vs. 10
Procedure standardization bias
Low vs. high 1.33 (0.85 to 2.08)
(n = 29 vs. 4)
0.13 1.09 (0.57 to 2
(n = 18 vs. 10
Outcome measure reliability bias
Low vs. high 0.90 (0.58 to 1.39)
(n = 24 vs. 7)
0.62 0.65 (0.24 to 1
(n = 24 vs. 2)
Low vs. unclear 0.95 (0.50 to 1.82)
(n = 24 vs 2)
0.87 1.07 (0.35 to 3
(n = 24 vs 2)
Note: n denotes number of comparisons.smoking cessation at six months from intervention start, but not
after incentive removal or at other time-points. Perhaps the classiﬁ-
cation of incentive value in this review was too crude to allow for ef-
fects to be detected at other time-periods, or there was insufﬁcient
statistical power to do so. Alternatively, if the sustained effects of in-
centives on smoking cessation reported herein are related to the in-
clusion of studies incentivizing pregnant smokers, then perhaps theths) Measurement time after incentive removal (months)
imates P-values Coefﬁcient estimates
(95% CI)
P-values Coefﬁcient
estimates (95% CI)
P-values
.65)
)
0.63 0.70 (0.09 to 6.18)
(n = 7 vs. 3)
0.70 0.95 (0.57 to 1.60)
(n = 7 vs. 6)
0.83
n/a 0.47 (0.08 to 2.87)
(n = 7 vs. 1)
0.36 n/a
(n = 7 vs. 0)
-
.69) 0.27 0.41 (0.01 to 16.65)
(n = 10 vs. 1)
0.60 0.78 (0.54 to 1.14)
(n = 11 vs. 1)
0.18
.48) 0.18 n/a (n = 10 vs. 0) n/a 1.02 (0.58 to 1.79)
(n = 11 vs. 1)
0.94
.58) 0.52 0.66 (0.18 to 2.48)
(n = 8 vs. 3)
0.50 1.36 (0.89 to 2.07)
(n = 8 vs. 6)
0.14
.85)
)
0.01 2.32 (0.50 to 10.71)
(n = 3 vs 7)
0.24 1.55 (0.79 to 3.03)
(n = 9 vs. 4)
0.18
.07)
)
0.89 0.40 (0.03 to 5.71)
(n = 8 vs. 2)
0.45 1.16 (0.68 to 1.98)
(n = 9 vs. 4)
0.56
.76) 0.38 0.39 (0.07 to 2.09)
(n = 8 vs. 1)
0.23 0.88 (0.60 to 1.29)
(n = 9 vs. 2)
0.48
.31) 0.90 0.58 (0.13 to 2.58)
(n = 8 vs 2)
0.42 1.66 (0.78 to 3.54)
(n = 9 vs 2)
0.17
Fig. 4. The effect of ﬁnancial incentives on health-behavior according to recipients' depri-
vation level at multiple measurement times.
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speciﬁc incentive scheme characteristics of these studies (such as
the use of high frequency incremental reinforcement schedules
that become gradually less frequent overt time (Marteau et al.,
2013)), the role of which was not assessed in this review.
Although ﬁndings show that smoking cessation can be sustained,
the evidence suggests that this effect does not persist beyond three
months after incentive removal. Between three and six months
from incentive removal only two studies out of nine signiﬁcantly fa-
vored the use of incentives (Volpp et al., 2009; Giné et al., 2010). The
ability of one of these to detect effects (Volpp et al., 2009) has been
attributed to the use of a large sample size and large rewards
(Cahill and Perera, 2011; Troxel and Volpp, 2012), characteristics
shared by both these studies. There was insufﬁcient power to con-
duct meta-regression analyses at this time-point to determine
whether under some conditions improvements could be sustained
beyond three months. The lack of signiﬁcant effects and effect mod-
iﬁers beyond six months from removal however, suggests that ulti-
mately changes disappear, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding incentive delivery.
In interpreting the effects of personalﬁnancial incentives on indicators
of healthier eating and/or physical activity, it should be noted that out-
comes assessed beyond six months from intervention start relate to
weight-loss. Consistent with the ﬁndings from a previous meta-analysis
(Paul‐Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2008), incentives did not improve
weight-loss beyond 12 months from intervention start and changes
were not sustained after incentive removal. The reduced duration of in-
centive effects on weight-loss compared to smoking cessation might
have several explanations. First, change in bodyweight reﬂects the cumu-
lative effects ofmany behaviors over time rather than the effect of a single
behavior (Jeffery, 2012). Second, many of the studies on weight-loss in-
cluded in the current review had small sample sizes. This, in combination
with the reported weakening of incentive effects over time, might have
resulted in a lack of power to detect effects at later time-points. Finally,
whereas the majority of studies on smoking cessation used rewards,
most studies on weight-loss used deposit contracts. Requiring
individuals to pledge their own funds rather than directly reinforcing
them might differentially affect outcomes. The moderating effect of
this incentive characteristic was not assessed in the present review.
Financial incentives have been predicted to bemore effective inmoti-
vating behavior-change in the most deprived (Sutherland et al., 2008).
Consistent with this, between six and 12 months from intervention
start, the effect of incentives across habitual health-related behaviors
was found to be greater for those classiﬁed as highly deprived. This is
the ﬁrst empirical evidence that we are aware of demonstrating the role
of recipients' deprivation level in themoderationof the impact ofﬁnancialincentives on health-related behavior. It is an important ﬁnding as it sug-
gests that incentive schemes contribute to reducing health inequalities.
Although impacts appeared greater for highly deprived individuals at all
time-points, differences were signiﬁcant only at one of these.
The effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives has also been suggested to
vary according to whether incentive attainment is certain (e.g. voucher
or cash payment) or uncertain (e.g. a lottery ticket), with some studies
suggesting the former to be more effective (Leung et al., 2002; Niza
et al., 2014). Findings from this review, however, suggest that changes
to habitual health-related behaviors are unaffected by the certainty
of incentive attainment. Given that the incentives of very few of
the included studies were classiﬁed as ‘uncertain’ (Hennrikus et al.,
2002; Volpp et al., 2008; Wing et al., 1996; Crowley et al., 1995), it
would be premature to draw conclusions from this review regarding
the moderating role of this incentive characteristic.
Implications
Behavior-change maintenance is critical for reducing the burden
of non-communicable diseases and should be the aim of interven-
tions targeting health-related behavior-change. Although the use of
personal ﬁnancial incentives appears useful in initiating healthier
behaviors, with changes sustained for some months after incentive
removal, results from this review suggest that effects may ultimately
dissipate, i.e. new habits do not appear to be formed. This is a problem
shared by most interventions targeting habitual health-behaviors at
an individual level (Ogden, 2012). This review did not compare the
use of incentives with other behavior-change strategies. It is therefore
unknownwhether incentives are better thanother strategies at produc-
ing short-term changes. If so, it might be worth complementing their
use with behavior-maintenance and relapse-prevention strategies,
which could be delivered after incentive removal. Consideration of the
use of ﬁnancial incentive schemes, however, should be informed by for-
mal cost-effectiveness analyses, which so far are rare. Even if cost-
effective, their application will depend on their acceptability to policy
makers, health professionals and the public. Their use for health promo-
tion attracts negative views (Promberger et al., 2011), although these
can be attenuated by evidence of their effectiveness (Promberger
et al., 2012). Consequently, what is found effective in studies will not
necessarily be considered acceptable in practice (Volpp et al., 2011).
Given the lack of sustained effects, in addition to the costs and com-
promised acceptability of usingﬁnancial incentives for changing health-
related behaviors, future research and policies should consider the ap-
plication of ﬁnancialmechanisms in the context of policies that alter en-
vironments at a population level, making health behaviormore likely to
be sustained (Marteau et al., 2012).
Strengths
This is the ﬁrst systematic review to provide an overall estimate of
the impact of personal ﬁnancial incentives across a range of habitual
health-related behaviors. It is also the ﬁrst to focus explicitly on assess-
ment of the sustained effects of incentives on habitual health-related
behaviors after their removal. Furthermore, it is one of the few reviews
to systematically assess the role of potential effect modiﬁers, thus
attempting to elucidate the circumstances under which incentives are
most effective. It is also the ﬁrst research that we are aware of to dem-
onstrate the role of recipient deprivation level in moderating the effects
of ﬁnancial incentives on health-related behavior, thus highlighting the
potential of incentive schemes to reduce health inequalities.
Limitations
Themain limitation of this review is the small number of studies and
associated lack of statistical power for certain comparisons, which re-
stricts the conclusions that can be drawnwith regard to: i. the sustained
84 E. Mantzari et al. / Preventive Medicine 75 (2015) 75–85impact of ﬁnancial incentives on overall behavior beyond 18 months
from intervention start; ii. the impact of ﬁnancial incentives on physical
activity; and iii. the role of certain of the targeted effect modiﬁers. Fur-
thermore, given the lack of eligible studies on alcohol consumption,
ﬁndings cannot be applied to all habitual health-related behaviors. In
addition, the roles of many other potential effect modiﬁers, such as
whether the incentive schemes involved the use of deposit contracts,
were not examined. Finally, a further minor limitation is that we were
unable, within available resources, to allocate more than one person
to screen title and abstract records in order to exclude records of clearly
ineligible studies prior to full-text screening. However, two reviewers
did work independently, blinded to each other's initial decisions, to
screen corresponding full-text study reports, which were used as the
basis for ﬁnal inclusion decisions.
Conclusion
Personal ﬁnancial incentives change habitual health-behaviors and
may help reduce health inequalities. However, their role in reducing
non-communicable disease burden is potentially limited, given the cur-
rent evidence that effects are not sustained beyond three months after
incentive removal.
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